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after the adjournment of the Legislature and must, within sixty
days after they meet, apportion the state into senatorial and repre-
sentative districts. A majority of the board shall constitute a
quorum. The apportionment made by the board, when signed by
three members and filed with the Secretary of State, "shall have
force and effect by law."3' The apportionment shall become ef-
fective at the next statewide general election, and the amendment
is to become effective January 1, 1951.
It is to be noted that the Supreme Court of Texas is expressly
given jurisdiction to force the board to perform its duty by writ
of mandamus, "or other extraordinary writs conformable to the
usages of law." 6
It would seem that this amendment provides a procedure which
will assure that the state will be re-apportioned following the next




AUTOMOBILE: DAMAGE BY A BAILEE AS EXCEPTED CAUSEW est American Insurance Co. v. First State Bank of Rio
Vista' was concerned with an exclusion clause of an insur-
ance policy providing as follows:
"This policy does not apply under coverage of theft, fire, or collision
while the automobile is subject to any bailment lease, conditional sale,
or other incumbrance not specifically declared and described in this
policy."
The court held that the company could escape liability under this
:5 Ibid.
s6 Ibid.
1 West American Ins. Co. v. First State Bank of Rio Vista, 213 S. W. (2d) 298 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948).
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clause if the automobile was subject to a bailment at the time of
the loss.
According to the facts of the case, A had purchased an auto-
mobile upon which the First State Bank of Rio Vista, Appellee,
held a lien for $880.00. A secured an insurance policy from the
Hartford Insurance Co. for protection against fire, theft, or col-
lision of said automobile for a period of one year, wherein the
bank as lien-holder was named payee to the extent of its interest.
A then sold the automobile to B who executed his note to the bank
for the $880.00. A endorsed this note. B obtained an insurance
policy upon the automobile from the West American Insurance
Co., Appellant, for protection against loss by fire, theft, or col-
lision of said automobile for a period of one year wherein the
bank was named payee to the extent of its interest. B later wrecked
and abandoned the car, and absconded. Wherefore A, under
advice from the bank, caused the automobile to be turned over
to one Nelson to be repaired. While in the possession of Nelson,
the automobile was stolen. It was later found overturned in a
ditch where it had burned. A and the bank sought recovery from
the Hartford and West American Insurance Companies. The
trial court allowed the bank to recover from West American to
the extent of its interest. The appellate court reversed the lower
court's decision and rendered judgment for West American. The
court's decision is doubtless correct because of extraneous facts
not pertinent here, but issue may be taken with one of the bases
which the court used in its reasoning.
The court stated in its holding:
"It was further provided among the exclusions in such policy that it
did not apply to coverage of loss or damage to the insured automobile
resulting from theft, fire or collision 'while the automobile is subject to
any bailment, lease, conditional sale, mortgage or other incumbrance




"[s]ince the loss and damage for which recovery is sought was sus-
tained while the automobile was subject to such bailment, such loss and
damage was expressly excluded by the terms of appellant's policy from
the coverage thereby afforded."8
It is be noted that the clause upon which the court based this
conclusion is clause (g) under Exclusions of the Texas Standard
Automobile Policy.4 This clause is contained in every policy of
insurance written upon an automobile in Texas. There is, how-
ever, a slight distinction between the clause as it appears in the
standard insurance policy and as the court quoted it. There should
be no comma between bailment and lease. The policy provision
refers to a bailment lease. That there is a distinction between
these terms was entirely overlooked by the court; result, an
erroneous conclusion which may, if not promptly refuted, cause
automobile owners in Texas unlimited trouble.
The court based its conclusion on two authorities, neither of
which support such conclusion; (1) Couch on Insurance,5 and (2)
Royal Ins. Co. v. Wim. Cameran.6 Couch in the section cited points
out two purposes of a provision for forfeiture in case of a change
of interest; (1) To prevent the interest of the insured from being
diminished, so as to keep the insured as much concerned in the
preservation of the property during the whole life of the policy
as he was when it was issued. (2) To prevent such an assignment
or transfer as destroys the transferror's insurable interest. Does
an ordinary bailment, such as placing an automobile in a garage
to be repaired violate either purpose? Clearly not. The insured
retains the same interest in the automobile as he had when the
policy was issued; and to say he no longer has an insurable inter-
est would be absurd.
The Cameron case is distinguishable. The policy in question
Id. at 303.
• Texas Standard Provisions for Automobile Policies as prescribed by the Texas
Board of Insurance Commissioners, p. 12 (1947).
5 5 COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 975 (1929).
6 Royal Ins. Co. v. Win. Cameron Co., 184 S. W. (2d) 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945)
wit o error refused.
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there was for protection against theft (broad form) which was
defined to mean loss of or damage to the automobile caused
by theft, larceny, robbery, or pilferage. The insured had placed
his car in a garage for storage and minor repairs and had left it
overnight as was his custom. The manager of the garage and
another employee had used the car and were involved in an
accident which resulted in the damage for which the insured
sought recovery. The court found the insurance company not
liable on the following grounds: the jury in the trial court had
not found that the garage manager took or used the automobile
with the intent of depriving the owner of its value or of per-
manently appropriating the same to his use or benefit. In the
absence of a felonious intent to steal, the loss complained of was
not caused by theft, larceny, robbery or pilferage within the
meaning of the policy sued upon. While the court did refer to a
clause similar to the clause in question, it was not basic to the
decision, and it is submitted that had the policy provided for pro-
tection against collision, the insured could have recovered.7
What caused the court in the principle case to fall into error
was the failure to distinguish between bailment and bailment
lease. The latter term is common to but one jurisdiction, Pennsyl-
vania. There the conditional sale contract was prohibited, and the
bailment lease transaction, which the courts permitted, resulted.
The best definition seems to be that In re Robinson,' as a legal
method by which one desiring to purchase an article, but unable
to pay therefor at the time, may secure possession thereof with
the right to use and enjoy it so long as he pays stipulated rentals,
he to become absolute owner after completing such installment
payments, on payment of an additional sum which may be nomi-
nal.9 The similarity between a bailment lease and a conditional
7 Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Brewton, 46 S. W. (2d) 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942);
Camden Fire Ins. Assn. v. Moore, 206 S. W. (2d) 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) writ of
error reluaed, n.r.e.
8 In re Robinson, 40 F. Supp. 320 (E. D. Pa. 1941).
9 See Valicenti v. Central Motors, 115 Pa. Super. Ct. 74, 174 Atd. 799 (1934).
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sale is brought out in Stern v. Paul,"0 wherein it is said that,
"[p]erhaps no entirely satisfactory definition of a bailment lease
as distinguished from a conditional can be given.""
Therefore, it is submitted that the term bailment lease is in-
cluded in the policy clause in order that the exclusion clause
would be of equal legal import in such a jurisdiction as Pennsyl-
vania, as in jurisdictions which recognize conditional sales. The
National Underwriters Service in discussing a loss payable clause
which includes susbstantially the same wording as the clause in
question, supports this contention as follows:
"Similar to the mortgage clause in fire insurance, the loss payable
clause provides that the interest of the lien-holders shall not be affected
by a breach of policy conditions or other act of omission on the part of
the insured. 12
The discussion pertains to the liability of the insurer to the
lien-holders noted upon the face of the policy where the insured
has breached the terms of the policy. It is to be noted that a bail-
ment-lessor is included as a lien-holder in the loss payable clause.
A bailee, as such, has no lien on the bailed property.
The clause in question specifies that, "This policy does not
apply while the automobile is subject to any bailment lease, con-
ditional sale, mortgage, or other incumbrance not specifically
declared and described in the policy." From the above it is clear
that when the bailment lease, conditional sale, mortgage, or other
incumbrance is specified in the policy, the holder of such in-
cumbrance is protected to the extent of his lien. The owner's
insurable interest would be diminished by the amount of the in-
cumbrance since a payment by the insurer to the lienholder for
a loss to the insured property would result in a discharge of the
owner's liability on the lien. Any transfer of ownership in the
insured property without the consent of the insurer changes the
10 Stern v. Paul, 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 112 (1928).
1I Id. at 113; note92 A. L. R. 330 (1934).
12 National Underwriters Service, Auto-Fire, Fi. 1 (1948).
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insured's insurable interest and voids the policy. 3 A bailment,
however, is not a transfer of ownership but only a transfer of
possession. Assuming continuity of thought in the clause, a bail-
ment lease can only be construed (note the subsequent terms;
conditional sale, mortgage, or other incumbrance) as a transfer
of a portion of the ownership of the automobile as distinguished
from a mere transfer of possession under a bailment. It seems
irrefutable that the court was in error in this conclusion. Since
the bailment lease is not common to Texas, it is probable that
the court was not properly briefed as to its definition and use,
and that the court failed to consider fully all aspects and char-
acteristics of a bailment lease transaction.. It is to be hoped that
any confusion that might result from the court's construction of
the policy may be averted and that the principle case as to this
point, will not be followed.
MARINE CASUALTY: CONSTRUCTION OF THE POLICY
In National Surety Marine Insurance Corp. v. Failing,4 A
had insured certain drilling equipment with the National Surety
Marine Insurance Co. The policy was designated as a transporta-
tion policy specifying coverage, "in any one casualty, either in
case of partial or total loss, or salvage charges, or expenses, or
all combined, while in transit." Immediately following was type-
written the following rider: ". . . or otherwise within the limits
of the continental U. S. and Canada." Also typewritten were
two additional riders: "this policy except as hereinafter provided,
insures against direct loss or damage by. . .," followed by eleven
express perils which the policy covered; and, "this policy does
not insure against. . .," followed by seven express perils which
the policy did not cover.
The loss for which the insured is seeking recovery occurred
while he was using the equipment covered by the policy for drill-
13 5 COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 975 (1929).
14 National Surety Marine Ins. Corp. v. Failing ,...... Tex....... , 211 S. W. (2d) 567
(1948).
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ing in Florida. Certain cavities in the earth were discovered and
before the equipment could be removed, the earth caved in,
cratered, and the equipment was lost. Loss in this manner was not
one of the eleven express events which the policy covered, nor one
of the seven which it expressly did not cover.
The majority of the court held that the policy was essentially
a transportation policy and the typewritten rider merely extended
the coverage during periods when the equipment was not in
transit and did not have the effect of extending coverage to losses
from any event. In the course of its decision the majority states:
"The language is neither ambiguous nor vague. It is a simple matter to
harmonize every part of the agreement and give them all effect. The
parties have plainly contracted that the scheduled property should be
insured against loss in any one casualty up to the stated amount if the
loss or damages result directly from any one or more of the eleven
listed perils."15
A strong dissenting opinion points out that the term casualty
as used just prior to the rider is much broader than the eleven
express perils which the policy covered; that since the policy con-
tains seven express perils which the policy does not cover, it
should be construed from the use of the term casualty to include
losses resulting from all other events which are properly included
in the term casualty; that any doubt in the construction of the
policy should be resolved against the insurer since his words are
being construed; and that if the insurer intended to limit the
coverage to the express perils, the intention should have been so
stated in clear and unambiguous language, to the effect that the
policy did not insure against risks not enumerated therein. The
dissenting judges said:
"If it had [not] been the intention of the insurer to include in the rider
all risks arising from a casualty, the intention could have been stated
in clear and unambiguous language, to the effect that the policy did not
insure against risks not enumerated therein."16
'a Id. at 570.
16 Id. at 571.
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Further:
"If it had been intended that the risks specifically listed were the only
risks covered by the policy, then it would not have been necessary for the
insurer to state further that other risks were not covered by the policy.""
A lengthy discussion as to the correctness of either view would
be of little avail as the principal question involved is one of con-
struction of the policy as governed by the intention of the parties
at the time of entering into the contract of insurance.'8 That any
ambiguity in the policy will be resolved against the insurer is
too well settled in Texas to require sustaining authority. The
majority has found the intent of the parties as shown by the
words of the policy to be clear and unambiguous, said intent
being that the eleven stated perils were exclusive. The dissent has
found their intent as shown by the policy to be ambiguous and
has properly resolved said ambiguity in favor of the insured.
The case does illustrate the necessity of stating concretely
in the policy the intention of the parties.
Tom Pennington.
17 Ibid.
18 Aird v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 141 (W. D. Tex. 1939), affirmed i08 F.
(2d) 136 (1939) ; note, 125 A. L. R. 1436 (1940) ; Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins..
Co., 139 Tex. 101, 161 S. W. (2d) 1057 (1942) modifying 146 S. W. (2d) 526 (Tex. Civ..
App. 1940).
